Religion, politics and the anxiety of Maslaha Reasoning :The production of a Fiqh al-Thawra after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution by Warren, David
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Religion, politics and the anxiety of Maslaha Reasoning 
Citation for published version:
Warren, D 2019, Religion, politics and the anxiety of Maslaha Reasoning : The production of a Fiqh al-
Thawra after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. in S Siddiqui (ed.), Locating the Sharia: Legal Fluidity in Theory,
History and Practice. Studies in Islamic Law and Society, vol. 48, Brill, pp. 226-248. DOI:
10.1163/9789004391710_014
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1163/9789004391710_014
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Early version, also known as pre-print
Published In:
Locating the Sharia
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Author’s Original of Book Chapter Submitted on 23 September 2016 Under Review with Brill 
David H. Warren is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Alwaleed Centre for the Study of Islam in the 
Contemporary World, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom; email: david.warren@ed.ac.uk 
 
Title: Regulating Maṣlaḥa Reasoning & the Production of a Fiqh al-Thawra After the 2011 
Egyptian Revolution 
 
Author: David H. Warren 
 
Abstract: This chapter investigates the maṣlaḥa-based reasoning of the ʿulamāʾ during the 
Egyptian Revolution and its aftermath, focusing in particular on ʿAli Jumʿa, Ahmad al-Tayyib, 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, as well as members of Qaradawi’s network the International Union of 
Muslim Scholars (IUMS). I show that the changes the ʿulamāʾ’s arguments undergo during the 
Revolution demonstrates that their understanding of the maṣlaḥa takes shape interdependently, 
rather than in isolation. Moreover, I show that, for the ʿulamāʾ, what is at state is the common 
good (maṣlaḥa) of the Egyptian nation, rather than the community. This difference is significant 
because the concept of the nation contains a host of new assumptions that the ʿulamāʾ can appeal 
to as the make their arguments, notably the assumption that nations must progress.  
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Introduction 
The contemporary ʿulamāʾ legitimate their interventions in the Arab public sphere by appealing 
to the concept of maṣlaḥa, or the common good. This trend was initiated by Muhammad ʿAbduh 
(d.1905) and Rashid Rida (d.1935), who expanded the conceptual remit of maṣlaḥa in order to 
reinvigorate the ʿulamāʾ’s voice in the public sphere.1 However, because maṣlaḥa arguments 
utilize utilitarian reasoning, rather than being explicitly rooted in the source texts, the ʿulamāʾ 
who intervene in the public sphere in the name of maṣlaḥa are vulnerable to the argument that 
they are twisting the texts in favor of their whims. 
In this chapter I am interested in how the ʿulamāʾ respond to this concern, and I use the 
work of Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b.1926) and his ʿulamāʾ allies during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution 
and its aftermath as an example. Qaradawi is the most well-known of the ʿulamāʾ who supported 
the Revolution, and he couched his reasoning in terms of the maṣlaḥa. However, over the course 
of the eighteen days of the Revolution Qaradawi’s reasoning changed in response to both 
unfolding events and the counter-arguments of his ʿulamāʾ interlocutors who supported the 
Mubarak regime.  
Here I will make three points about contemporary ʿulamāʾ and their concern over 
consistency in their reasoning, or the lack of it. First, I argue that the ʿulamāʾ’s concern with 
appearing consistent is a result of their internalization of the distinction between religion and 
politics. This internalization manifests itself in the ʿulamāʾ’s assumption, which their critics 
share, that religious interventions in the realm of politics must be consistent if they are to be 
considered sincere and not manipulative. Second, I will show that the ʿulamāʾ’s understanding of 
the substance of the maṣlaḥa, what the common good actually is in a given situation, forms 
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interdependently through contestation. As such, the ʿulamāʾ do not meditate in private upon the 
common good, and then intervene in the public sphere consistently on behalf of that position. 
Rather, their arguments change, both in the short term and the long term. However, that does not 
mean that ʿulamāʾ are not concerned about being accused of inconsistency, the opposite in fact.  
Therefore, my third point is to show how the ʿulamāʾ make use of networks of supporters, 
Qaradawi and his allies in this instance, to produce Islamic legal knowledge ex post facto in 
order to produce the effect that their maṣlaḥa reasoning was consistent with both a theory and the 
source texts. The production of Islamic knowledge under the rubric of fiqh al-thawra (the 
jurisprudence of revolution) after the Egyptian Revolution is evidence of this phenomenon.  
In order to make these arguments, and after a brief discussion of maṣlaḥa in 
contemporary fiqh theory, I will use Qaradawi’s media interventions during the eighteen days of 
the Egyptian Revolution to demonstrate how his maṣlaḥa arguments changed in response to the 
counter-arguments of his interlocutors, particular the former Egyptian Grand Mufti ʿAli Jumʿa 
(b.1952) and the Shaykh of al-Azhar Ahmad al-Tayyib (b.1946). I then draw upon a selection of 
four books and articles that were produced by Qaradawi’s allies from the International Union of 
Muslim Scholars (IUMS) and the Association of Qaradawi’s Students (Rābiṭat Talāmīdh al-
Qaraḍāwī, RTQ). After the Revolution these allies produced Islamic legal knowledge to provide 
an ex post facto theory that would create the effect that Qaradawi’s maṣlaḥa arguments had been 
consistent. This theory was called fiqh al-thawra.  
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Maṣlaḥa in Modern Fiqh  
In premodern fiqh maṣlaḥa was a minor and somewhat controversial concept. Jurists were 
hesitant to utilize maṣlaḥa-reasoning given that such considerations were not explicitly rooted in 
the source texts. Though a number of jurists did utilize maṣlaḥa-reasoning, the concept’s place in 
the premodern Islamic legal schema was always a tenuous one.2 This situation changed when 
ʿAbduh and Rida argued for the transformation of the status of maṣlaḥa. Their vision for the 
renewal of the fiqh tradition depended upon bringing maṣlaḥa from the margins of fiqh theory to 
its center. Rida elaborated upon the pre-existing distinction between ritual acts of worship 
(ʿibādāt), which were immutable and grounded in an explicit text, and legal rulings that 
concerned human interactions (muʿāmalāt), which were subject to change. In his effort to render 
maṣlaḥa an autonomous source of law in its own right, Rida argued that all muʿāmalāt rulings 
were revisable according to changing social conditions. Significantly, these revisions could be 
made on the basis of maṣlaḥa alone.3 However, Rida seemed uncomfortable at the extent to 
which his emphasis on maṣlaḥa appeared to prioritize human will at the expense of the divine 
will evidenced in the text.4 Nor did Rida articulate a definitive model for how the ʿulamāʾ should 
balance the perceived needs of the day with their reading of the texts as they sought to find and 
articulate the maṣlaḥa in the public sphere.5 
 
The Fragmentation of Knowledge and the Mixing of Religion and Politics  
The period in which Rida was advancing his new ideas was a period characterised by the 
fragmentation of ʿulamāʾ’s scholarly authority. New voices entered the public sphere in 
competition with the ʿulamāʾ and secular intellectuals, some trained at new educational 
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institutions like the Dār al-ʿUlūm,6 began to articulate their own visions of the common good.7 
Moreover, the shift from the pre-modern to modern periods was characterised not only by a 
fragmentation of authority, but a fragmentation of knowledge. Modernity fragmented knowledge 
and social life into different spheres: culture, economics, politics etc. As part of this fragmentary 
process the knowledge that the ʿulamāʾ possessed was re-defined as a specialized form of 
knowledge called “religious” knowledge, because it was understood as arising from the study of 
“religious” texts.8  
The assumption that religion and politics are two distinct forms of knowledge conforming 
to two distinct realms that should not, above all, mix originates in a process that began in 
sixteenth century Europe before spreading unevenly throughout the colonized world.9 I argue 
that it is a result of this fragmentary process that the attempt to contribute religious knowledge to 
a different realm, particularly politics, came to be understood by both the ʿulamāʾ and their 
competitors as requiring additional justification. This is because these contributions were 
perceived by all involved as mixing religion and politics. An intervention that is understood as 
mixing religion and politics is met with suspicion regarding its legitimacy and sincerity, 
evidenced by the well-known Arab slogan “no politics in religion, no religion in politics.” While 
the ʿulamāʾ reject the argument that religion and politics should not mix, I contend that their 
rejections nevertheless demonstrate that they have internalized the religious-political distinction 
to the extent that is self-evident to them as well. Qaradawi, for example, arguing against the 
separation of religion and politics says, “It is not possible to improve human life if Islam is 
responsible for only part of it […] it is not possible that Islam be [solely] for the mosque, while 
the school, university, law court, television, journalism, theatre, cinema, souq and street are [left] 
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to secularism.”10 His argument for the relevance of religion to socio-political life is clearly 
rooted in the supposition that these terms relate to distinct realms.  
 
The Interdependency of Maṣlaḥa Reasoning During the 2011 Egyptian Revolution 
The contemporary ʿulamāʾ do not intervene in the public sphere with fully-formed notions of 
what maṣlaḥa in a given situation actually is. Rather, they elaborate further upon their 
understanding of the maṣlaḥa in response to the counter-arguments of their interlocutors, who 
raise particular issues and contest certain parts of an ʿālim’s argument while overlooking others. 
As such, over the course of the Egyptian Revolution Qaradawi elaborated upon his maṣlaḥa 
arguments in response to counter-arguments, but also changed his arguments in response to 
unfolding events.   
The demonstrations that would cause Mubarak’s departure began on January 25 2011. 
However, Qaradawi waited until January 27, the third day of protests, before making his first 
intervention. In an interview with the Cairene newspaper al-Shurūq, Qaradawi’s initial message 
was one of general support,  
 
There is no doubt that what happened in Tunisia is a powerful lesson, and should 
be repeated. The Arab nations are changing for the better, and should be granted 
their rights and their freedom [...] the people who have gone out to give voice to 
their desire [for freedom], no one is defending them, and no party or political 
force is representing them, but they represent Egypt.11 
 
Four protesters had been killed by the police that day, and Qaradawi attempted to dissuade the 
police from further violence saying, “I want Egypt to become like other countries, that treat 
protesters with respect, and not be subjected to violence. The expression of an opinion is a 
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human right.” Referring to the police, Qaradawi added, “Whoever says he is a servant of the 
ruler, I say to him, you are servant of God, and the killing [of protesters] is forbidden.”12 
The following day, January 28 2011, Qaradawi’s language shifted to a different register 
and incorporates more explicit references to Qurʾan and Hadith. In an interview with al-Jazeera 
Qaradawi commented upon the concept of obedience to the ruler. Qaradawi speaks about this 
subject because other ʿulamāʾ in Egypt had begun to raise it as part of their rationale for 
continuing to support Mubarak.13 As such, obedience to the ruler had become part of the 
conceptual terrain over which the maṣlaḥa was being contested. Though Islam maintains a 
general principle of obedience, Qaradawi said, the ruler’s right to obedience was not absolute. 
By way of justification, Qaradawi quotes the Qurʾan’s rebuke to those who obeyed Pharaoh 
(43:54), and argued that the right to obedience was enjoyed only by the ruler who was obedient 
to God, and implemented His rule in the spirit of justice, dignity, and freedom.14 It is noteworthy 
that Qaradawi referred to the abstract category “Islam” rather than a particular text or authority. 
Referring to Islam in this manner, I suggest, is evidence that Qaradawi considers himself to be 
contributing a distinct brand of knowledge, religious knowledge, to the public sphere. 
That day was the second day of demonstrations, and the regime’s attempts to suppress the 
protestors had intensified. Communication networks had been disrupted, and eleven protesters 
had been killed by the police in Suez while the Interior Ministry warned darkly of taking 
“decisive measures” to end the protests.15 It was in response to these new developments that 
Qaradawi began to argue that Mubarak was not a ruler entitled to obedience saying,  
 
As for [the ruler] who rebels against the religion (al-dīn), and oppresses the 
people, steals and plunders their wealth, how can he be obeyed? There is no 
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obedience to anyone who is disobedient (maʿṣiyya) to God, Muslims are all in 
agreement about that [...] as it says in the hadith “there is to be no obedience to 
that which is disobedient to God, but rather obedience is to that which is good.”16  
 
That same day, Mubarak dismissed the Egyptian Cabinet, and appointed for the first time a Vice-
President to implement “constitutional and legislative reforms.” Nevertheless, riots continued 
throughout the night across the country.17  
The following day, the Shaykh of al-Azhar al-Tayyib gave a statement to the media. 
Tayyib argued that while the initial protests were legitimate in calling for reform, the 
appointment of a Vice-President and Mubarak’s subsequent promises of change represented the 
fulfilment of this demand. As such, Tayyib argued that the protests “no longer have any 
meaning” and had achieved their goals. While Tayyib described those who have been killed 
during the protests up to that point as martyrs, given the increasing violence across the country, 
he argued that further protests represented a “call to chaos,” and a rebellion (khurūj). He also 
described the ʿulamāʾ (i.e. Qaradawi) who have called for further protests as “beckoning toward 
the gates of Hell.”18 That same day, January 29 2011 was the first time Qaradawi echoes the 
demonstrators’ calls for Mubarak to leave office. Responding to Tayyib’s argument that the 
sacking of the government and promises of reform were sufficient, Qaradawi replied that 
Mubarak “Lives in a different world, and has no feeling for what is happening in the Egyptian 
street.”19   
Jumʿa waited until February 2 to make his first major statement to the media. That day 
had been the most violent of the Revolution so far. Approximately 1500 people had been injured 
in Cairo as pro-Mubarak supporters attacked the protesters in Tahrir Square with sticks and 
knives.20 Speaking to the media that day Jumʿa called on the protesters to return to their homes, 
 
 
8 
 
and justified his argument by referring to “common ground of the country” (maṣlaḥat al-balad), 
which Jumʿa understood as the need to preserve life and property. What is needed is “change, not 
destruction” (taghyyīr laysa tadmīr),21 Jumʿa said. In another statement Jumʿa blamed the 
protestors for causing the turmoil.22 As Jumʿa places the blame for the current turmoil upon the 
protestors, he cites a well-known hadith that reads “Fitna is sleeping, may God curse whoever 
wakes it.”23 Though non-violent protests are not illegitimate in themselves, Jumʿa reasoned, what 
made them illegitimate is if they lead to violence and chaos, which to him was clearly occurring 
in this instance. Jumʿa’s reasoning was based upon the principle that an otherwise lawful action 
was rendered unlawful on the basis of its consequences (sadd al-dharāʾiʿ).24  
Qaradawi’s own statement on February 2 was intended as a response to Jumʿa’s 
argument, and it took up the new themes he raised. Qaradawi contested Tayyib and Jumʿa’s 
argument that the protests represented a rebellion, and instead expanded upon the pre-existing 
principle that there is an obligation upon individuals to advise a ruler who has strayed, which 
Qaradawi said was part of the obligation to command the right and forbid the wrong. Qaradawi 
argued that the obligation to advise a ruler fell upon Muslims as a collective and the protesters 
were performing this obligation by their actions. Addressing the increasing violence, and Jumʿa’s 
argument that further protests should be forbidden, Qaradawi argued that Islam prescribed strict 
rules that regulated rebellion so that it did not lead to civil war. At the same time, Qaradawi 
argued that peaceful resistance had become “a means to bring about positive change worldwide, 
and often leads to the fall of dictatorships” and Islam welcomed such new practices.25  
During the Revolution it was on Fridays after the congregational prayer that the largest 
demonstrations occurred. As such, both Jumʿa and Qaradawi made their statements on February 
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2 with the following Friday, February 4, in mind. Qaradawi urged all Egyptians who were able to 
take to the streets after the prayer, referring to the coming February 4 as “The Friday of 
Resolution” (jumʿat al-ḥasm).”26 Jumʿa made his counter-argument in an interview the following 
day, Thursday February 3. While he expressed sympathy with those protesting against the 
government (“the issue is that people cannot even find a mouthful of bread”) Jumʿa painted a 
picture of increasing chaos throughout the country. He viewed the protests as even clashes 
between supporters and opponents of the government, rather than simply a one-sided 
government repression of dissent. With that in mind, Jumʿa issued a fatwa allowing people to set 
aside the obligation to perform the congregational prayer saying, “Is it permissible for people to 
go to the Friday prayer tomorrow? Yes. But if people are fearful for their person or property 
(khawf al-fitna ʿalā nafs wa’l-māl), it is possible they can set aside the prayer. I am not saying do 
not go to prayer tomorrow, but it is permitted [to not go].”27 In that instance Jumʿa was 
referencing a pre-existing position held across the madhāhib that the obligation to perform the 
congregational Friday prayer could be set aside during times of strife. Jumʿa added that he had 
received hundreds of calls from Egyptians who were fearful of the chaos in the streets.28  
That Friday, hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered in Tahrir Square after the 
prayer, though it was not until a week later that Mubarak finally resigned. As Qaradawi praised 
the Revolution’s success Doha that day, he described it as the end result of decades of 
perseverance (ṣabr) under unjust rule. As he did so, Qaradawi divided up the time that Egyptians 
had lived under dictatorship into three stages: perseverance under unjust rule, a popular uprising, 
followed by the overthrow of the government. Qaradawi arranged these three stages according to 
the well-known hadith, “He who among you sees something abominable should change it by his 
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hand; and if he has not strength to do that, he should do it by his tongue; and if he has not 
strength to do even that, then he should [abhor it] in his heart; that is the least of faith.” For 
Qaradawi, the final stage of overthrowing the government could only come after passing through 
earlier demonstrations, and a long period of perseverance under unjust rule when people were 
silent and only abhorred their oppressors in their hearts. Qaradawi describes this period of 
perseverance as a “Jihad of the Heart” saying, “what does it mean to make Jihad through your 
heart? It means that you boil inside, waiting for the hour that [the heart] explodes into a sudden 
outburst of emotion and positive action.”29 One reason Qaradawi presents this chronology is 
because he had not consistently called for the overthrow of Egypt’s dictators since his exile to 
Qatar in 1961, and at times had been rather ambivalent toward the Mubarak regime.30 As such, 
Qaradawi’s purpose in positioning the Egyptian Revolution as an outcome of decades of 
perseverance under dictatorship is to provide a model that explains why his maṣlaḥa reasoning in 
previous years had not consistent with his support for the 2011 Revolution.  
As Qaradawi advanced his understanding of the maṣlaḥa over the course of the eighteen 
days of the Revolution, the substance of his arguments changed. Qaradawi shifted from a 
statement of general support for the demonstrations, to calling for Mubarak to leave office, to 
then describing the success of the Revolution as the culmination of progressive stages of 
activism: Jihad by the heart (quiet perseverance), then the tongue (protest), then the hand 
(revolution). By contrast, Tayyib appeared satisfied with the regime’s promises of reform and 
Mubarak’s sacking of the government on January 29. Jumʿa argued that the protests had initially 
been legitimate, but then became illegitimate as chaos increased. Laying the blame for this 
disruption upon the anti-government protesters, Jumʿa’s arguments made repeated reference to 
 
 
11 
 
the harm the protests appeared to be causing. What is noteworthy here is that the ʿulamāʾ 
debated their positions on the same terms, forming their understanding of the maṣlaḥa 
interdependently as they contested concepts like obedience to the ruler.31 
Currently, in the study of the contemporary ʿulamāʾ, how best to make sense of the 
inconsistencies between their abstract theories and their statements in response to immediate 
events remains something of an enigma. Zaman argues that the ʿulamāʾ should be viewed as 
activists just as much as they are studied as articulators of consistent theories, and that there is 
little to be gained from highlighting the instances when an ʿālim’s theory and practice are 
inconsistent.32 At the same time, however, I contend that the ʿulamāʾ have internalized the 
hegemonic assumption that a changing argument inconsistent with a previous position requires a 
particular justification. Moreover, the ʿulamāʾ view their interventions in the public as the 
interventions of religious leaders in politics. As such, even though they think their interventions 
are legitimate, they nevertheless think they are doing something that requires an additional 
justification. I suggest ʿulamāʾ provide such a justification by producing knowledge ex post facto 
theories in an attempt to demonstrate that their changing maṣlaḥa reasoning did indeed conform 
to an overarching model, and was consistent with the source texts. The production of fiqh al-
thawra in the aftermath of the Revolution is one such example of this trend.  
 
Producing Fiqh al-Thawra After the Egyptian Revolution 
Knowledge is produced socially, which is to say that knowledge is the product of a particular 
social context. Islamic legal knowledge, fiqh, is no exception. I have argued that Qaradawi and 
his allies assumed that their maṣlaḥa-based interventions in the public sphere required additional 
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justification, because they have internalized the categorization that they are religious leaders 
intervening in the realm of politics. As a result, Qaradawi and his colleagues begin to produce 
knowledge in the form of models to show that their maṣlaḥa reasoning had an overarching and 
consistent structure and was not simply the creation of their whims. Qaradawi and his colleagues 
called this knowledge fiqh al-thawra.  
Qaradawi began producing this fiqh al-thawra two days after Mubarak’s departure on 
February 13 2011 during an episode of Sharia and Life, the popular Aljazeera program he had 
hosted since 1996. His first goal was to establish the legitimacy of non-violent protests as a 
means to reform a government or overthrow a regime. The need to legitimize protests in Islamic 
legal terms had become necessary because it had been contested by Qaradawi’s interlocutors.33 
Qaradawi argued that a rebellion (khurūj) as discussed in Islamic legal sources explicitly referred 
to armed rebellion (al-khurūj al-muṣallaḥ) against a government. Since the Egyptian revolution 
was unarmed, it therefore should not be classified as khurūj.34 The second part of Qaradawi’s 
argument referred in more detail to the concept of obedience to the ruler. This concept is 
generally rooted in 4:59, “O you who believe! Obey God and obey the Messenger and those 
charged with authority from among you (minkum). If you differ in anything among yourselves, 
refer it to God and His Messenger.”35 In the interview, Qaradawi said that the ʿulamāʾ who have 
argued that the ruler is entitled to unqualified obedience have made the mistake of reading this 
particular verse in isolation, neglecting the verse that precedes it. The preceding verse (4:58) 
reads, “God commands you to render back your Trusts (amānāt) to those to whom they are due; 
and when you judge between people that you judge with justice: truly how excellent is the 
teaching which He has given you! For God is He who hears and sees all things.”36 If we turn our 
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attention to this preceding verse, Qaradawi told his audience, then it becomes clear that “God has 
charged [rulers] with ruling according to two foundational principles. First: rendering security to 
the people, to the full extent of the word “Trusts” (amānāt). Second: Ruling the people with 
justice.” Qaradawi’s argument focuses on a reinterpretation of the term “Trusts” (amānāt). This 
term is interpreted, by the exegete Ibn Kathir (d.1373) for example, as referring to something that 
someone is expected to take care of, be it on behalf of someone else, or the obligations a believer 
is entrusted with by God (i.e. prayer).37 Here, Qaradawi interpreted the term amānāt in the light 
of the remainder of the verse, which referred to ruling with justice. As such, Qaradawi argued 
that amānāt referred to the security and protection a ruler is expected to provide to the people.  
Qaradawi then argued that those who have focused solely on the second of these two 
verses, 4:59, and interpret the clause “Obey God and obey the Messenger and those charged with 
authority from among you” have not taken into account the specificity of “from among you” 
(minkum). Qaradawi argued that “from among you” means the ruler is an agent of the people, 
rather than in a position of dominion.38 With this point in mind, Qaradawi argued that that there 
is a need to change the prevailing culture among the security forces, who view themselves as the 
servants of the ruler. Instead, Qaradawi said that the security forces must understand they are 
servants of the citizenry.39 
To justify his own interventions in support of the Revolution, Qaradawi then highlighted 
historical moments when the ʿulamāʾ have sided with the people against oppressive rulers. 
Qaradawi cited the examples of Saʿid Ibn Jubayr, who famously participated in the rebellion 
against the Umayyads, and ʿAbd al-Qadir’s resistance against the French in Algeria. Rather than 
appealing to a specific text as he makes this argument, Qaradawi’s argument appealed to “the 
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spirit (rūḥ) of the Quran, and the spirit of the Sunna, and the spirit of those who strive for the 
sake of God.” Then, responding to Jumʿa’s argument that the common good was best served by 
people remaining in their homes, Qaradawi asked “how can a Muslim ʿālim forbid an individual 
Muslim from speaking the truth, and commanding the good and forbidding the wrong?”40  
For Qaradawi, the non-violence of the protesters during the Egyptian Revolution 
represented a model to be replicated. With that in mind the RTQ and the Doha-based Qaradawi 
Center for Islamic Centrism and Renewal (markaz al-qaraḍāwī li’l-wasaṭiyya wa’l-tajdīd) 
produced a book titled 25 January: A People’s Revolution. In the introduction, Qaradawi wrote 
that his purpose was to “take the opportunity to present a jurisprudence of revolution (fiqh al-
thawra) to the umma.”41 As such, Qaradawi first point is to assert the legitimacy of maṣlaḥa-
based reasoning saying, “whoever reads the books of fiqh will find hundreds of examples of 
rulings that base their analogical reasoning on the logic of maṣlaḥa.”42 Notably, Qaradawi also 
writes that a purpose of the book is to respond to criticisms of his role during the Revolution, 
particularly his return to Cairo for the Tahrir Square Sermon on February 18 2011. The sermon 
had been praised in the Egyptian daily al-Miṣrī al-Yawm as “one of the greatest sermons of the 
modern era,”43 while in the Western media the image of a prominent ʿālim returning from exile 
after a revolution had seen him dubbed the “Egyptian Khomeini.” At the same time, other 
portions of the Egyptian media were highly critical of his return, and the television channel Miṣr 
al-Nahār Dah even banned Qaradawi from appearing on air for fear of where further boosts to 
his stature might lead at that tumultuous time.44 The prominent journalist Mohamed Hassanein 
Heikal (d.2016) also drew comparisons between Qaradawi and Khomeini, and argued that 
Qaradawi’s return represented an effort by the Muslim Brotherhood to co-opt the Revolution. 
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Qaradawi took this criticism seriously, and attempted to respond to Heikal’s concerns in 25 
January. Significantly, Qaradawi’s defended his role during the Revolution by saying that there 
was a need to contribute legitimate fiqh opinions in the face of obfuscation by the Shaykh of al-
Azhar and the Grand Mufti. Qaradawi argued that Egypt’s youth were able to determine who 
was legitimately on the side of the Revolution and who was not.45 My point is that Qaradwai 
acknowledged Heikal’s criticism that his support for the Revolution was the intervention of a 
religious scholar in politics and, as such, required additional justification.   
 While Aria Nakissa has written in more detail about how Qaradawi legitimated his fiqh 
arguments in support of the Revolution in relation to pre-existing fiqh rulings,46 in this chapter I 
am also concerned with how this knowledge is arranged in texts to produce certain effects. Aside 
from Qaradawi’s introduction, the book 25 January does not contain any original material, but 
instead begins with two fatwas he had published in 2009 and 2010. In the book, these two fatwas 
are then followed by a verbatim reproduction of all Qaradawi’s media interventions during the 
Revolution. This arrangement is intended to produce the effect that Qaradawi’s maṣlaḥa 
reasoning during the Revolution was consistent with his earlier positions as represented by these 
two fatwas.  
The first fatwa is titled “Who pronounces the corruption of the ruler?” and Qaradawi 
argued that such a pronouncement rested with “the ʿulamāʾ who are free” that is, those who do 
not serve in state institutions. Moreover, Qaradawi emphasized that being “free” ʿulamāʾ did not 
mean they were at liberty to intervene in the public sphere however they saw fit. Instead, they 
must follow “the Muslim general will (al-raʾī al-ʿāmm) and the public’s Islamic conscience (al-
ḍamīr al-ʿāmm), which binds (yaqayyid) those among the ʿulamāʾ who are free.”47 The second 
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fatwa referred to the legitimacy of peaceful protests, and Qaradawi referred specifically to the 
concern that they are an imported political practice from the West and, as such, illegitimate.48 
Qaradawi’s argued, “The important thing is we take [from the West] that which is in accordance 
with our doctrines, values, and laws (sharāʾiʿnā).”49 In the fatwa, Qaradawi elaborated in greater 
detail what he meant,  
 
If they [protests] serve legitimate ends, like calling for the implementation of 
shariʿa, or freeing those imprisoned without legitimate grounds, or halting military 
trials of civilians, or cancelling a state of emergency that gives the ruler absolute 
powers, or achieving people’s general aims like making available bread, oil, sugar, 
gas, or other aims whose legitimacy admits of no doubt in things like these, legal 
scholars do not doubt the permissibility [of demonstrations].50 
 
Placing these two fatwas prior to the reproduction of Qaradawi’s interventions during the 
Revolution, was intended to produce the effect that his practice during the Revolution followed, 
not just a consistent position, but also the will of the public. 25 January was intended to lay the 
foundations for fiqh al-thawra.    
 
Producing Fiqh al-Thawra Through Commentary 
In the attempt to establish fiqh al-thawra as a new model of maṣlaḥa reasoning, Qaradawi was 
assisted by his colleagues from IUMS. In this section I examine the fiqh al-thawra literature as 
commentaries. Commentaries provide a new discourse with an “identity and sameness” whereby 
“new verbal acts are reiterated, transformed, or discussed” and, I would add, further 
established.51 I will now examine three works by ʿAli Muhyi al-Din al-Qaradaghi (b.1949), 
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Wasfi Abu Zayd (b.1975) and Ahmad al-Raysuni, which I argue should be understood as 
commentaries producing fiqh al-thawra.  
The establishment of fiqh al-thawra through commentary comes first in the form of 
articles, and then in books. Qaradaghi published an article in July 2011, and his aim was to 
respond to the assertion that non-violent protests inevitably led to violence and civil strife. To do 
so, Qaradaghi produced a model listing the criteria that protests must conform to if they were to 
be considered legitimate. He argued that a non-violent protest could only retain its legitimacy if 
it remained peaceful, “Even if they face armed repression from the government, they must not 
deviate from non-violence.” Moreover, protests were only to occur “as a response to government 
injustices, or due the passing of legislation that contravenes the rulings of the Sharia (aḥkām al-
sharīʿa) such as the permitting of usury, alcohol, alcoholism, or moral depravity.”52 As an 
elaboration on Qaradawi’s argument that protests could only serve “a legitimate end, such as 
calling for the implementation of the Sharia, or freeing those imprisoned without legitimate 
grounds,”53 Qaradaghi said protests were legitimate if they had “legitimate intentions (maqāṣid 
mashrūʿa), such as casting off oppression” but “may not have personal, or party political 
interests.”  If protests observed this model, Qaradaghi argued, then they were legitimate and 
could not be considered khurūj. Qaradaghi said that, rather than being khurūj, non-violent protest 
was a contemporary means of commanding the right and forbidding the wrong. Moreover, while 
Jumʿa argued that otherwise legitimate protests became illegitimate if they cause violence and 
civil strife, grounding his reasoning in the concept of sadd al-dharāʾiʿ, Qaradaghi’s reasoning 
was based on intentions. Qaradaghi implied that if non-violent protests unintentionally led to a 
violent uprising they would still have been legitimate.54  
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 Abu Zayd’s commentary was far more detailed, and appeared as a book titled, Qaradawi, 
The Revolutionary Imam. Like the members of the RTQ who produced 25 January, Abu Zayd 
aimed to show that Qaradawi’s maṣlaḥa reasoning during the Revolution was consistent with 
both the source texts and Qaradawi’s earlier writings. To produce this effect, Abu Zayd’s book 
was structured in the same way as 25 January inasmuch as Abu Zayd’s own commentary was 
placed prior to the verbatim reproduction of Qaradawi’s interventions over the course of the 
Revolution’s eighteen days. Abu Zayd’s commentary was structured to present the reader with 
each set of  legal sources, including the Qurʾan, the Sunna, the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa and legal 
maxims that, as he put it, “nourished” (ghadhā) Qaradawi’s reasoning during the Egyptian 
Revolution.55 As with 25 January, this arrangement intended to produce the the effect that 
Qaradawi’s practice followed a model, rather than vice versa.  
In Abu Zayd’s first chapter, “Qaradawi’s Sharia-based points of departure during the 
Revolution,” he established a connection between the textual source material and Qaradawi’s 
maṣlaḥa reasoning in a novel way. Abu Zayd first presented a list of thirty short Quranic verses 
that related thematically to resisting oppressive rule, such as verse 71:4 “For when the Term 
given by God is accomplished, it cannot be put forward, if ye only knew.”56 It is striking that 
these verses, followed by a selection of hadith such as, “the best Jihad is to speak a word of truth 
to an unjust ruler,” were presented as a simple list and surrounded on the page by empty space. 
As such, they were disconnected from a discussion of the circumstances of their revelation 
(asbāb al-nuzūl), or any exegetical or other legal commentary.57 This arrangement facilitated 
Abu Zayd’s argument that these Qurʾanic verses and hadith, as a whole, “place a special 
emphasis on one meaning and one concept [alone], the resistance of oppression.”58 Abu Zayd 
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argued that these sources acted as a whole, rather than individually, to channel Qaradawi’s 
maṣlaḥa reasoning during the Revolution.  
The next stage of Abu Zayd’s commentary was to draw connections between Qaradawi’s 
reasoning and legal motifs derived from premodern authorities, such as the concept of fiqh al-
wāqiʿ (a deep and true understanding of the social reality) attributed to Ibn al-Qayyim. In Abu 
Zayd’s commentary, the relationship between Qaradawi’s reasoning and the social reality is a 
reciprocal one, which works by “understanding the necessities of the reality, and understanding 
the law of God that is relevant to it either in the Qurʾan or the Sunna, then applying one to the 
other.”59 At the same time, Qaradawi and Abu Zayd’s referral to fiqh al-wāqiʿ is slightly 
different. In Qaradawi’s own writings relating to the jurisprudence of Muslim minorities, for 
example, the social reality is presented as a justification to relax a specific ruling by 
demonstrating a legal necessity (ḍarūra). By contrast, here Abu Zayd posits an attentiveness to 
the social reality as an explanation for why Qaradawi’s positions changed over the course of the 
eighteen days of the Revolution. Rather than portraying Qaradawi’s waiting for five days before 
explicitly calling for Mubarak’s departure as an inconsistency in need of justification, Abu Zayd 
described this shift as a feature of Qaradawi’s “attentiveness” (waʿī) to the changing social 
reality.60 Abu Zayd cited statistics to produce knowledge of social reality that appeared 
objective. For example, Abu Zayd cited a statistic that forty percent of Egyptians lived in poverty 
in order to produce seemingly objective evidence for the necessity of Mubarak’s departure. 
Then, Abu Zayd attributed the shift in Qaradawi’s argument to calling for Mubarak’s departure 
to Qaradawi’s awareness that this departure was the will of the people, and again Abu Zayd 
attempted to establish this necessity numerically. Abu Zayd reported that when Qaradawi 
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understood that eight million young Egyptians had taken to the streets across the country, he 
realized the revolution was a true representation of the people’s will or the “public conscience” 
as Qaradawi put it. This was because those eight million protestors represented the will of their 
extended families as well, who “supported [the revolutionaries] in their hearts, but were not 
themselves able [to go out and protest].”61   
 The second chapter of Abu Zayd’s book is titled a presentation of the “the legal maxims 
regulating Qaradawi’s discourse during the revolution.” The chapter is divided into ten sections, 
each beginning with a legal maxim.62 Legal maxims are short epithetical statements that are 
occasionally taken from the Qurʾan or hadith but are more commonly found in the work of 
premodern authorities, who considered them to be expressive of the goals of the Sharia. As is 
clear from the title, Abu Zayd’s goal in this chapter was to emphasize that Qaradawi’s maṣlaḥa 
reasoning was “regulated” by the Sharia, as evidenced by the maxims, and was not simply the 
product of his whims. Abu Zayd’s argument was predicated upon making connections between a 
general maxim and a specific example taken from Qaradawi’s reasoning during the Revolution. 
For example, one maxim read, “an action that is necessary to fulfil an obligation is itself an 
obligation” (mā lā yatimm al-wājib ilā bihi fa-huwa wājib). Abu Zayd’s commentary proceeded 
by first citing the maxim in the work of a premodern authority, in this case, al-Ghazali’s (d.1111) 
al-Mustaṣfā. Abu Zayd then provided a premodern example showing how this maxim had been 
utilized in the past. In this example Abu Zayd cited a statement from al-Zarkashi (d.1373) that 
argued a portion of water containing a ritually unclean substance, such as blood or urine, became 
unlawful in its entirety. The analogy Abu Zayd drew between al-Zarkashi’s example and 
Qaradawi’s discourse is striking, “and among the applications of this [maxim] in Qaradawi’s 
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discourse is that the corruption that had come to pass [in Egypt], the repression, the poverty, the 
authoritarianism that had reached such an extent that it had to be changed and stood up against, 
and would not end except by going out in mass demonstrations.”63 In Abu Zayd’s presentation, 
this maxim regulated Qaradawi’s reasoning as he produced his fatwa that attending 
demonstrations, especially on Fridays, was obligatory for all who were able. As Abu Zayd put it, 
Qaradawi’s knowledge of the goals of the Sharia, evidenced by this maxim, played a role in 
structuring Qaradawi’s legal reasoning, so he realized that reforming the regime piecemeal was 
not possible, and it had to be swept away in its entirety by revolution. 
Another of Abu Zayd’s maxims stated, “All that contravenes a fixed principle is invalid” 
(kull mā khālif aṣlan qaṭaʿiyyan mardūd), which Abu Zayd drew from al-Shatibi’s al-
Muwāfaqāt. In Abu Zayd’s commentary, this maxim regulated Qaradawi’s rebuttal of the 
arguments made by Jumʿa, Tayyib when they cited specific verses or hadith, such as “fitna is 
sleeping, may God curse whoever wakes it,” in order to argue for obedience to a ruler (i.e. 
Mubarak) no matter the circumstances. After presenting the maxim Abu Zayd then quoted from 
an interview by Qaradawi on Sharia and Life during the Revolution in which he said,  
 
I am truly sorry that the great ʿulamāʾ accuse these youth of going astray, 
rebelling against Islam, and causing fitna […] I do not know how they [the 
ʿulamāʾ] could have forgotten the verses and hadith that reject oppression! 
Hundreds of verses in the Holy Qurʾan reject oppression, and curse the 
oppressors.64  
 
Abu Zayd then gave his commentary on Qaradawi’s words,  
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So, the Shaykh here is explaining that it is not correct jurisprudence and not 
rational that we abandon clear texts and explicit rulings, and become preoccupied 
with speculative interpretations and unclear texts [...] how can [anyone] oppose 
the hundreds of verses and sound hadith that make explicit the matter [of 
opposing injustice] without any doubt or hesitation?65  
 
In Abu Zayd’s commentary the number of Qurʾanic verses and hadith that condemn oppressive 
rule serve to establish, in their entirety, resistance to oppression as a “fixed principle,” as per the 
aforementioned maxim. As such, this fixed principle of resisting oppression outweighed any 
individual verses or hadith that others may have cited in order to argue for obedience to an unjust 
ruler.66 It was only after Abu Zayd has established this model in this manner over three chapters 
and one hundred and seventy pages that he then presented to the reader the texts of each of 
Qaradawi’s fatwas and interviews with the media over the eighteen days of the Revolution. The 
effect that this arrangement produced for the reader was that Qaradawi’s changing maṣlaḥa 
reasoning were channelled by the texts of the Quran, the Sunna, legal maxims, and were also 
consistent with Qaradawi’s own oeuvre on the basis of motifs such as fiqh al-wāqiʿ. 
 The final commentary to be discussed here takes a very different form to the others. 
Rather than focusing on Qaradawi in particular, or attempting to produce a model that might 
channel maṣlaḥa reasoning in future revolutions and produce the effect of consistency, al-
Raysuni took an entirely different approach. Completed in January 2012, Raysuni’s book Fiqh 
al-Thawra argued instead that the maṣlaḥa was not to be found through particular models, but 
was instead the result of contestation. At first, Raysuni’s argument proceeded along lines 
familiar to readers of Qaradawi: the achievement of the maṣlaḥa in public life represented the 
achievement of the purposes of the Sharia (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa). However, while Qaradawi 
argued for the need to allow for maṣlaḥa reasoning that was not grounded in the texts and can 
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revise pre-existing rulings, Qaradawi also imagined the substance of the maṣlaḥa to be 
something that can be agreed upon definitively in a particular context. It was in this regard that 
Raysuni, in my reading, departed from Qaradawi. Qaradawi argued for the maintenance of what 
he called the constants of the community (thawābit al-umma), and expressed a certain frustration 
that issues long thought to have been closed to consensus were re-debated.67 Raysuni, by 
contrast, appeared to envisage the finding of the maṣlaḥa to be the result of active contestation 
and bargaining between people, rather than coming as the result of interpreting the text in the 
light of new social conditions or following prevailing social customs (as Qaradawi would say). 
Raysuni described the relationship between the source texts and politics or systems of 
government as vague. For Raysuni, what was required then was, not only the motifs that one 
might expect: independent reasoning (ijtihād), consultation (shūra) etc., but also another concept 
that Raysuni called al-taʿāruf.68 Contrasting al-taʿāruf with social custom (al-ʿurf al-ijtimāʿī), 
which societies have agreed upon passively over time, Raysuni elaborated upon what he intended 
by this concept, 
 
I mean by al-taʿāruf that which the people consciously decide upon as result of 
intentional choice. So the meaning of al-taʿāruf is more specific than social 
custom. Though social custom is established and accepted by the people, it is 
concluded passively over time. As for al-taʿāruf, it carries the meaning of mutual 
understanding, mutual agreement, and active bargaining [...] As such, while social 
custom (al-ʿurf al-ijtimāʿī) is a suitable point of reference for the public in terms 
of their mutual interactions and ways of thinking, it is neither suitable nor 
sufficient for politics or governance.69   
 
What Raysuni intended by al-taʿāruf becomes clearer when he elaborated upon his 
understanding of the application of the Sharia. Rasyuni elaborated upon a frequently quoted 
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passage from al-Ghazali’s al-Mustaṣfā to the effect that whatever achieves the purposes of the 
Sharia represented the maṣlaḥa. “All that guarantees the preservation of these five foundational 
purposes [faith, life, rationality, progeny, property], that is the maṣlaḥa.”70 To Raysuni, this 
passage meant, “All that is good and brings benefit on the face of the earth, and consequently 
avoids corruption or harm on the face of the earth, that is the Sharia.”71 As such, achieving the 
maṣlaḥa is a true representation of the Sharia. In contrast to a figure like Qaradawi, whose 
theoretical writings on the maṣlaḥa focus on the realm of good governance (siyāsa sharʿiyya),72 
Raysuni considered the application of the Sharia to extends beyond the realm of the government, 
but was also a responsibility of civil society at large.73  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the maṣlaḥa reasoning of prominent ʿulamāʾ during the Egyptian 
Revolution and its aftermath, focusing in particular on al-Qaradawi and his IUMS colleagues. 
During the Egyptian Revolution, I have argued that the ʿulamāʾ’s understanding of the maṣlaḥa 
took shape interdependently, rather than in isolation. I also argued that as a result of the colonial 
process the ʿulamāʾ have internalized the hegemonic distinction between religion and politics. 
Resulting from this internalization is the assumption that political activism should be consistent 
in order to be considered sincere, and religious reasoning must be grounded in texts. As such, 
while Zaman argued that the ʿulamāʾ should not be approached solely as “systematic thinkers 
articulating an internally consistent philosophy, but rather as activist intellectuals responding 
over the course of long careers to new and old controversies,”74 with any deviation from their 
theories being criticised as inconsistency, the ʿulamāʾ themselves attempt to produce the effect 
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that their maṣlaḥa reasoning is consistent with their earlier arguments. The ʿulamāʾ take great 
pains to emphasise that their maṣlaḥa reasoning is not only regulated by the texts and the 
tradition of their scholarly forebears, but also bound by the will of the public, in whose name 
they claim to speak. The ʿulamāʾ who are the most successful in this regard work as mutually 
supportive networks, and members the IUMS network surrounding Qaradawi produced models 
through commentary to create fiqh al-thawra after the 2011 Revolution. Abu Zayd’s model 
aimed to show the Qaradawi’s changing maṣlaḥa reasoning was consistent with the source texts, 
legal maxims, and Qaradawi’s oeuvre at large, while Qaradaghi produced a model attempting to 
overturn the connection between non-violent protests and civil strife. A notable exception to this 
trend, however, was the work of Raysuni, who pointed toward an argument that finding of the 
maṣlaḥa was the result of mutual contestation by multiple voices, rather than an individual’s 
reading of the text in the light of changing social conditions. The aftermath of the Egyptian coup 
in 2013 may have rendered IUMS’s effort to produce a fiqh al-thawra redundant for now, and 
Qaradawi’s support for the Sunni regime’s repression in Bahrain in February 2011 severely 
weakened his own authority among large segments of the Arab public.75 At the same time, 
Raysuni’s concept of mutual contestation and deliberation, or al-taʿāruf, as a means of finding 
the maṣlaḥa may offer an important new vista for the politics in the Arab World. 
1 Samira Haj, Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality, and Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 77–83. 
2 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age: Religious Authority and Internal Criticism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 109–10. 
3 Felicitas Opwis, “Maṣlaḥa in Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory,” Islamic Law and Society 12, no. 2 (2005): 
182–223 (18-20). 
4 Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1966), 203–8. 
5 Aria Nakissa, “The Fiqh of Revolution and the Arab Spring: Secondary Segmentation as a Trend in Islamic Legal 
Doctrine,” The Muslim World 105, no. 3 (2015): 298–321 (5-6). 
                                               
 
 
26 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 Cairo’s Dār al-ʿUlūm was founded in 1872 as a state-run, higher-education institution. For more on the Dār al-
ʿUlūm see Hilary Kalmbach, “Dār al-ʿUlūm,” ed. Kate Fleet et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, n.d.). 
7 Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 131. 
8 Abdulkader Tayob, “Religion in Modern Islamic Thought and Practice,” in Religion and the Secular: Historical 
and Colonial Formations, ed. Timothy Fitzgerald (London: Acumen, 2007), 177–92 (12-3). 
9 Timothy Fitzgerald, “Encompassing Religion, Privatized Religions and the Invention of Modern Politics,” in 
Religion and the Secular: Historical and Colonial Formations, ed. Timothy Fitzgerald (London: Acumen, 2007), 
211–40. 
10 Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, al-Dīn wa’l-Siyāsa: Taʾsīl wa-Radd Shubuhāt, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2013), 70. 
11 Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, 25 Yunāyir Thawrat Shaʿb: al-Shaykh al-Qaraḍāwī wa’l-Thawra al-Miṣriyya (Cairo: 
Maktabat Wahba, 2011), 36–37. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Nakissa, “Fiqh,” 10–14. 
14 al-Qaraḍāwī, 25 Yunāyir, 38–40. 
15 “Timeline: Egypt’s Revolution A Chronicle of the Revolution That Ended the Three-Decade-Long Presidency of 
Hosni Mubarak,” Aljazeera, February 14, 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html. 
16 al-Qaraḍāwī, 25 Yunāyir, 39. 
17 “Timeline.” 
18 Aḥmad al-Ṭayyib, Aḥmad al-Ṭayyib Yuftī bi-an Muẓāhirāt Mīdān al-Taḥrīr Ḥarām Sharʿan, n.d., 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-bFg3MfyPuI. 
19 al-Qaraḍāwī, 25 Yunāyir, 42–43. 
20 “Timeline.” 
21 ʿAlī Jumʿa, Muftī Miṣr, February 2, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7leQws-
tEB0&list=FLHfyNVWjX2twX7IcYPOURZA&index=32. 
22 ʿAlī Jumʿa, Maqṭaʿ Ṣawtī li’l-Muftī ʿAli Jumʿa Athnāʾ al-Thawra, October 25, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzf_79q9fKo. Nakissa, “Fiqh,” 14. 
23 Jumʿa, Muftī Miṣr. 
24 Nakissa, “Fiqh,” 14. 
25 al-Qaraḍāwī, 25 Yunāyir, 58. 
26 Ibid., 60. 
27 ʿAlī Jumʿa, Fatwā D. ʿAlī Jumʿa bi-Khuṣūṣ Taẓāhirāt Yawm al-Jumʿa, n.d., 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=98tPO8eC310&list=FLHfyNVWjX2twX7IcYPOURZA&index=30. 
28 Ibid. 
29 al-Qaraḍāwī, 25 Yunāyir, 108. 
30 An example of this qualified support came during an uprising in Cairo’s Ain Shams district in 1988.  While the 
ʿulamāʾ of al-Azhar quickly legitimized the government’s violent crackdown, Qaradawi emphasized the need for the 
taking of peaceful measures to re-exert control of the district. However, Qaradawi also said, “we believe in the faith 
of the regime and we trust the regime’s faith in Egypt.” He also said that the Qurʾan and Sunna “stipulate clear ways 
for thwarting deviations from the correct path, which do not include […] undue haste in stipulating reforms.” 
Raymond W. Baker, Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2003), 83–89.  
31 In more general terms, Muhammad Zaman refers to this process as “internal criticism.” See Zaman, Modern. 
32 Ibid., 310. 
33 Nakissa, “Fiqh,” 10–14. 
34 Qaradawi argues that there are three ways to change a government: First, by democratic elections. Second, by a 
peaceful revolution. The third means is by a process taghallub. Qaradawi describes taghallub as the swift overthrow 
of one government and its replacement with another by force. In Qaradawi’s description, overthrowing a 
government by force can be legitimate on the basis that the overthrow occurs with such immediate and 
overwhelming force that a civil war is avoided. Ironically, this is the justification put forward in July 2013 by ʿAli 
Jumʿa to legitimate the coup. al-Qaraḍāwī, 25 Yunāyir, 1 .
 
 
27 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
35 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qurʾan (Brentwood, MN: Amana, 1991), 203. I have preferred to 
use Yusuf Ali’s translation for this chapter, but have preferred the word God in place of Allah.    
36 Yusuf Ali, Meaning. 
37 Ibn Kathīr writes that the term amānāt “refers to all things that one is expected to look after, such as God’s rights 
on His servants: praying, Zakah, fasting, penalties for sins, vows and so forth. The [term] also includes the rights of 
[believers] on each other, such as what they entrust each other with”. Saifur Rahman al-Mubarakpuri, trans., Tafsir 
Ibn Kathir, vol. 2, 6 vols. (New York, NY: Darussalam, 2000), 493. 
38 al-Qaraḍāwī, 25 Yunāyir, 152–53. 
39 Ibid., 143. 
40 Ibid., 159. 
41 Ibid., 7. 
42 Ibid., 32.  
43 Samīr Farīd, “al-Qaraḍāwī fī Iḥdā Aʿẓam Khuṭab al-ʿAṣr al-Ḥadīth Yuʾakkid Istimrār al-Thawra,” al-Maṣrī al-
Yawm, February 19 2011, http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=288341. 
44 Bettina Gräf, “Media Fatwas and Fatwa Editors: Challenging and Preserving Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s Religious 
Authority,” in Media Evolution on the Eve of the Arab Spring, ed. Leila Hudson, Adel Iskandar, and Mimi Kirk 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 139–57 (2). 
45 Qutb al-ʿArabī, “Haykal wa’l-Qaraḍāwī wa’l-Khumaynī,” al-Yawm al-Sabīʿ, February 20 2011, 
http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=355329; al-Qaraḍāwī, 25 Yunāyir, 8–9. 
46 Nakissa, “Fiqh,” 8–18. 
47 al-Qaraḍāwī, 25 Yunāyir, 21–23; idem, Fiqh al-Jihād, 1:204–9. More specifically, Qaradawi grounds his 
legitimacy in his view that he is giving voice to the will of the Egyptian nation, though further discussion of this 
point is beyond the remit of this chapter.  
48 Nakissa, “Fiqh,” 14–15. 
49 al-Qaraḍāwī, 25 Yunāyir, 31. 
50 Ibid., 33. Quoted in Nakissa, “Fiqh,” 17. 
51 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 
220. 
52 ʿAlī al-Qaradāghī, “al-Taʾsīl al-Sharʿī li’l-Muẓāhirāt al-Silmiyya,” July 8, 2011, 
http://www.qaradaghi.com/portal/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=1978:2011-07-08-
06-57-23&amp;catid-14:2009-04-11-15-11-36&amp;Itemid=8. 
53 al-Qaraḍāwī, 25 Yunāyir, 33. 
54 al-Qaradāghī, “al-Taʾsīl.” 
55 Waṣfī Abū Zayd, al-Qaraḍāwī al-Imām al-Thāʾir: Dirāsa Taḥlīliyya Uṣūliyya fī Maʿālim Ijtihādihi li’l-Thawra 
al-Miṣriyya (Britton Farms, OH: Sulṭān li’l-Nashr, 2011), 44. 
56 Yusuf Ali, Meaning, 1533. 
57 Nakissa, “Fiqh,” 19. 
58 Abū Zayd, al-Imām, 49. 
59 Abū Zayd, al-Imām, 56–58. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 59 
62 Nakissa, “Fiqh,” 18–19. 
63 Abū Zayd, al-Imām, 114–15. 
64 Ibid., 133. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Nakissa, “Fiqh,” 19. 
67 Zaman, Modern, 134. 
68 Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, Fiqh al-Thawra: Murājiʿat fi’l-Fiqh al-Siyāsī al-Islāmī (Beirut: Namaa for Research and 
Studies Center, 2012), 13. 
69 Ibid., 13, n. 1. 
 
 
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
70 Ibid., 74. 
71 Ibid., 75. 
72 Zaman, Modern, 114. 
73 al-Raysūnī, Fiqh, 77. 
74 Zaman, Modern, 310. 
75 David H. Warren, “The ʿUlamāʾ and the Arab Uprisings 2011-13: Considering Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the ‘Global 
Mufti,’ between the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Legal Tradition, and Qatari Foreign Policy,” New Middle 
Eastern Studies 4 (2014): 17, 31. 
